Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Modern War Studies)

by Mary E. Glantz, David M. Glantz

Release Date: April, 1999

Edition: Hardcover

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This not a dry history text

Glantz's well balanced account of Operation Mars is outstanding. Glantz does a masterful job of logically breaking down the Russian assault against the Rhezev salient into fronts which the reader follows chronologically in a style that is alive and engrossing. The text has numerous excellent maps. Glantz's access to formerly secret Soviet documents and his interpreation of the battle makes for an excellent read. This book is a good book for those who want to get into the "meat" of the Eastern Front, not for the casual reader.

A Fresh Account that Alters Our View of the Eastern Front

David M. Glantz, a military officer and expert on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, has written an excellent operational summary of the virtually unknown Operation "Mars" (the operation was such a disaster that the Soviets suppressed records of it until recently), the Soviet attempt to pinch off the German 9th Army in the Rhzev salient in November-December 1942. Even readers familiar with the Eastern Front will find their beliefs altered by his book. As Glantz clearly demonstrates, the well-known Operation Uranus counterattack at Stalingrad was actually a strategic deception for the main effort near Moscow. Soviet Marshal Zhukov wanted to destroy ArmeeGruppe Center but he ordered the Stalingrad attack to precede Operation Mars in order to divert German attention and reinforcements to the south. Unfortunately for him, the Germans did not become diverted and their defenses remained steady. Unlike the 6th Army at Stalingrad, the German 9th Army was well entrenched and had powerful mobile reserves. Zhukov's attack was a spectacular failure despite larger forces being used there than in the Stalingrad counteroffensive. The Soviets failed primarily because they could not breach the German defenses quickly and the Germans (Field Marshal Model) did a superb job of shifting mobile reserves around to meet each crisis in turn. Severe winter weather actually degraded the Soviet artillery preparation (poor visibility limited observed fires), which undermined the initial breakthroughs. Amazingly, Zhukov continued to order frontal assaults for three weeks, even though the offensive was obviously failing to achieve its objectives in the first four days. Soviet losses in the three week offensive on this front totaled at least 100,000 killed, 235,00 wounded and about 1,800 tanks. German counterattacks cut off and eliminated three Soviet corps (one tank, one mechanized, and one rifle). After the Stalingrad operation succeeded and Operation Mars failed, Soviet historians erased all mention of Zhukov's attack and instead re-wrote history to make it appear that Stalingrad always was the main effort. The only deficiencies in this account that keep it from being outstanding are: (a) only marginal information is provided on the air campaign over the salient, (b) there is no detailed information on German forces defending the salient prior to Zhukov's attack (e.g. discussion of mobile reserves available, logistics, status of defenses, obstacles), and (c) no real assessment of Soviet units as to quality, equipment, training, prior experience, etc. Maps are decent in terms of quantity and quality although use of acronyms instead of map symbols clutters maps and makes them difficult to read (e.g. "6GCD" for 6th Guards Cavalry Division). However, if you want to learn something new and important about the Eastern Front, read this book.