The Battle for Kursk, 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study (Cass Series on the Soviet Study of War, No. 10.)

by Harold S. Orenstein, David M. Glantz

Release Date: August, 1999

Edition: Paperback

Price:

More Info

The Battle for Kursk---by the numbers.

This recent addition to the study of the Eastern Front of WWII provides a detailed look at the Soviet actions in the spring and summer of 1943 preparing for the action around the Kursk salient. The translation of the Soviet General Staff Study, there is not as much propaganda included as one might expect; rather, this is an internal look at the battle shortly after its completion that was meant to provide a guide to other Red Army units of the lessons of Kursk. The study forthrightly identifies failures in engineering, aviation and anti-tank gunnery.

With eleven chapters, 33 maps and 40 tables covering force ratios, kilometers of trenches dug, ration of weapons to kilometer of frontage, relative combat power projection assessments, this study reads like a scientific text. In fact, after Stalin's purges of the officer corps in the later 1930's, the Soviets were forced to search for a scientific approach to the art of war, because they had so few generals and colonels who could practice the intangibles.

The description of the preparations for the battle is the strength of the book. The intelligence staff, and operational planners, correctly identified the most likely thrust of the German offensive as early as March. Evaluating the force structure remaining after the surrender of the 6th Army's surrender at Stalingrad, and the known German tactics, the staff was able to predict the attack on the northern and southern flanks of the salient, and begin preparing a defense in depth. The focus of effort was the engineering work, and propositioning of ammunition and fuel for the fight. The force was also restructured to provide a very heavy mobile counterattack force that comprised almost 1/3 of the total force structure available, and almost 80% of the available tanks.

The Germans used new tanks, the 'Tigers', and new self-propelled assault guns together with integrated air in a new attack grouping at Kursk. This grouping penetrated Soviet defenses, and caused general havoc in the front two lines, but it lacked sufficient combined arms combat power to achieve a rupture of the lines that would allow an exploitation force through. In general terms, the Germans should have attacked with infantry to clear through the minefields, obstacles, automatic weapons and mortars, and then allowed the assault grouping of tanks and self propelled guns through. The integration of air directly with the assault groups was very effective, but the Soviets mention that the result of so much German air against the front lines was almost total freedom of movement from the rear for operational and even strategic reserves.

The actual fighting of the battle is not exhaustively covered in this book; if you are looking for tank on tank details from Prohkorovka, this is not the book for you. If you want to get a sense of the level of detail required to successfully plan modern combined arms combat, this is a must read.

Kursk as you've never read it

As far as I'm concerned, this is the best volume ever produced on the fateful Battle Of Kursk, probably real turning point of WWII and one of the most misunderstood and overlooked battles in recent history. It is - more or less - a straightforward translation of the general study on the battle that the Soviet General Staff (under a collective authorship) wrote in 1944. Guess what? It is a technical, sometimes brutally candid account of the battle as seen from different point of view: the Gernman plans and offensive, the Soviet defense, the aerial battle, the artillery, and - of course - the tank manouvers. Even if the style is - naturally, given the origins of this volume - often dry and matter of fact, it is nonetheless a mandatory read for every Eastern Front enthusiast. It is all here - countless first hand infos on the battle, hour-by-hour accounts of the action, loads of maps (albeit not always well readable), details on tactis and strategy... the only thing missing is the dreaded "human angle", but given that personal accounts are - often - just an excuse for melodrama and manipulation of the reader, if you're serious on history I'll not miss it a bit. It astonishing how balanced and objective this study is (possibly because it was for "internal circulation", and not for the general public) and it make some sort of ironic comparison with the lack of anything like that on the German side - the OKW study on the battle looks like it was written by von Manstein's lawyer! All in all - another invaluable service by col. Glantz to the dwindling community of Eastern Front historians...