The Military Revolution and Political Change

by Brian Downing

Release Date: 29 December, 1992

Edition: Paperback

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Interesting thesis, well written book

Downing makes a strong and easy to follow argument that European governments were able to support the modern standing armies of the 17th and 18th centuries only by destroying decentralized proto-representative institutions inherited from medieval times and taking direct control of taxation, conscription, and military leadership. Such governments then developed into autocracies, whereas, in countries that either didn't need large standing armies or were able to support those armies by plunder rather than taxation, the medieval institutions survived and eventually developed into democracies. The argument is backed by interesting, although brief, comparitive historical anlyses of Prussia, France, Britain, Poland, Holland, and Sweden. Personally, I wasn't entirely convinced, but Downing is an unusually clear and concise writer and knows his stuff, so it's worth deciding for yourself.

interesting but flawed interpretation of Early Modern Era

downing notes that a "military revolution" is the driving force behind the transformation of the demesne state towards our own modern day liberal democracy. i find myself questioning downing's basis of causality. besides taking a step much too large for his short tract, i am overcome by great difficulties in his reasoning. why could this idea not work in the opposite direction? the author provides little to answer this basic contention. is it possible that it was the emerging form of government that provided the foundation for such increasingly complex and 'revolutionary' war efforts and not the other way around as downing suggests? to me this seems at least equally plausible and possibly more so. this interpretation is based on a theory of governmental change just as downing has his argument based on an assumption of military change. in short, how is it possible to tell which is changing and therefore affecting the other? the author makes no attempt to clarify this. e.g. gunpowder was around early on but was not widely proliferated in battle until much later due to poor casting and inconsistent manufacturing. if war were really the driving force behind the political developments then why is it that only when the political superstructures have seemingly evolved sufficiently that we find gunpowder in sudden widespread use? his effort is to be lauded in that he has at least provided an interesting and somewhat comprehensive account of a difficult and complex subject matter.