Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956

by Alexandr Kirov, Miklos Horvath, Jeno Gyorkei

Release Date: February, 1999

Edition: Paperback

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New Insights on the 1956 Crisis

Jeno Gyorkei and Miklos Horvath, eds. _Soviet MilitaryIntervention in Hungary, 1956_ . Trans. Emma Roper Evans. Budapest:Central European University Press, 1999. xv + 318 pp. Tables, photographs, maps, endnotes, biographical notes. (cloth), ISBN 963-9116-36X ; (paper), ISBN 963 9116 35 1.

The _Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956_ , edited by Jeno Gyorkei of the Military History Institute in Budapest, and Miklos Horvath, of the Hungarian Army's Political College, is a worthy addition to the series of books by Columbia University Press (Atlantic Studies on Society in Change ) that surveys many aspects of East Central European society. [1] Originally published in Hungarian in 1996, this book consists of three essays, each about one hundred pages, by Gyorkei and Horvath, Alexander Kirov, and Yevgeny Malashenko, respectively [2]. All three selections primarily focus on Soviet and Hungarian military actions in the 1956 crisis, rather than the Soviet decision making process, or the influence of other Warsaw Pact countries. In the book's preface, Bela Kiraly, the chief editor of the series and a key participant in the 1956 events, poses--and then answers--four questions about the Hungarian crisis, which have preoccupied scholars from former communist countries. First, was the 1956 uprising a revolution or counter-revolution? If it was a revolution, did it succeed or fail? As Kiraly contends, "Without 1956 the radical changes of the 'lawful revolution' that commenced in 1989 and is still in progress would not have happened, or if it had, it would not have been what it is today." (xiv) (The Hungarian Parliament passed a resolution on May 2, 1990 classifying the events of 1956 as a "revolution" and "war of independence.") Second, was the introduction of Soviet troops an aggressive act, or did it constitute military aid to a beleaguered socialist state that had requested it? Kiraly confirms that the Soviet actions did amount to war by pointing out the size of the Soviet military force used in Hungary in the November 4 intervention (17 divisional units), the number of Soviet casualties (722 men killed, 1,251 wounded), and the number of medals awarded to Soviet soldiers (26 "Hero of the Soviet Union" medals, 10,000 combat medals). Kiraly argues that if the USSR had to exert such a great effort, this could not have constituted mere "aid" to Hungary. (Let us also remember Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy's last radio appeal at 5:20 a.m. on November 4, in which he states that the USSR "attacked our capital with the obvious intention of overthrowing the legitimate Hungarian democratic government." In addition, on October 24, 1991, as reported by _ Izvestiia _, the Soviet Supreme Council categorically condemned the Soviet troop intervention, acknowledging it as an interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. ) Thirdly, was there indeed armed conflict between "socialist" states? Kiraly asserts that Hungary had no intention in 1956 of completely abandoning socialism, and therefore the Soviet Union did attack another socialist state. Finally, was the declaration of neutrality on November 1 the cause, or the effect, of Soviet aggression? Kiraly states that Nagy's declaration was merely the effect; by November 1 Khrushchev and his colleagues were already informing other Warsaw Pact leaders in Bucharest, and on the island of Brioni the following day of impending action. (....)Kiraly, commander-in-chief of the National Gua END