Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000

by Stephen Kotkin

Release Date: October, 2001

Edition: Hardcover

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Why the USSR Really Collapsed

"...What no one, from national-security experts to ordinary citizens such as my mother, dared to dream was that within ten years of Brezhnev's death, the Soviet Union would collapse and simply cease to exist. How and why did this momentous event occur? Princeton University historian Stephen Kotkin takes up these salient questions in his concise, readable, and informative book Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000.

"Kotkin dismisses the oft-cited explanations that emphasize increased U.S. military spending and the failure of central planning, arguing that as late as 1985 the Soviet Union was 'lethargically stable' (p. 2). Instead, he blames attempts -- first initiated by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization effort and culminating in Gorbachev's policies of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization -- to reform a system that was inherently incapable of reform. To offer only an explanation of the Soviet Union's collapse, no matter how compellingly argued, however, is unsatisfactory because that explanation leaves too many questions unanswered. Why were the reforms undertaken? Why did the Soviet elites not resist them? What effect did the Soviet legacy have on the reforms? By considering these questions, Kotkin provides a deeper understanding of the Soviet Union's astonishing collapse....

"The man to undertake the reforms was Mikhail Gorbachev. Perhaps the most revealing comment on Gorbachev is a 1988 statement by Milovan Djilas that Kotkin quotes: 'Gorbachev, unlike Brezhnev, strikes me as a true believer' (p. 31). Perhaps he was a true believer because, as Kotkin points out, he had witnessed many socialist and Soviet triumphs: for example, Sputnik, manned space flight, and communist takeovers in China and Cuba. Whatever the reason, this belief entailed that Gorbachev would not be satisfied with 'lethargic stability.' He would seek reforms, and, unlike Khrushchev, he had the political skills to carry them through. Perhaps surprisingly, he attempted reform for a largely receptive population who maintained a 'strong allegiance to socialism' (p. 44) despite deteriorating economic conditions (for example, it typically took ten years to get an apartment). Neither Gorbachev nor the populace realized that reform ultimately would lead to collapse....

"According to Kotkin, what made Gorbachev's reforms so risky, far riskier than Gorbachev ever realized, was that he, unlike Khrushchev, did not have an ideological safety net. Whereas Khrushchev could say that socialism's failure was owing to Stalin and that reforms would restore 'Leninism,' when Gorbachev acknowledged socialism's need for reform, the only possible conclusion was that socialism itself was inherently flawed. In the end, the Soviet Union could not afford the superpower competition. Its economy was underperforming, and its ideology was bankrupt. It withdrew from Afghanistan and gave up eastern Europe. In August 1991, conservatives tried to restore the old order, but their attempt failed with Boris Yeltsin's standing triumphantly and defiantly atop a Soviet tank. With nothing to hold the Soviet Union together, it disintegrated without the bloodshed that many had believed inevitable. Gorbachev acknowledged reality by formally dissolving the union in December 1991.

"The USSR may have formally ended its seventy-four-year existence in 1991, but its legacy resulted in a continuing collapse, which Kotkin documents in chapters 5 and 6. In Russia, Yeltsin promised a market economy, although he knew nothing about one. Even a politician with the most thorough understanding of market capitalism would have been unable to withstand the former-Soviet elites who were establishing their own version of 'capitalism.' These elites, many of whom had abandoned any ideological attachment to socialism and the rest of whom were quite willing to do so when faced with the possibility of financial gain, began systematically to appropriate state assets. Kotkin explains the appalling and systemic corruption that contaminated the privatization process, which culminated in perhaps the most egregious episode, the infamous 'loans for shares' deal. Realizing that the 'mass opportunism of self-privatization' was irreversible, vice premier Anatoly Chubais simply chose to 'institutionalize' and 'rationalize' it (p. 130)....

"In sum, Kotkin presents a practical, accessible, and informative account of the Soviet Union's collapse. His book stands as a suitable complement to Richard Pipes's Communism: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2001), which explores more of the philosophical reasons for communism's demise. Yet Kotkin's book is more than a historical retelling of the Soviet Union's fall. It provides an explanation of how and why the Soviet Union fell, a story of socialism's inability to compete with the West, its loss of hope, and the willingness of those in power to prostitute any remaining belief in socialist ideals for corrupt material gain. The book also serves as a case study of socialism's inability to reform itself without self-destruction and of the ensuing institutional shortcomings that render market capitalism and political liberalism difficult to obtain. Those who believed that Russia could quickly copy the economic perfor-mance and political liberty of the West failed to understand that the Soviet Union's legacy was antithetical to markets, private property, and the rule of law. Kotkin's book should appeal to any reader who grew up in the shadow of the Cold War and wants to understand more fully not only how and why the Soviet Union fell, but also why its legacy has been so bitter and enduring."

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Excerpted from a review by Jody Lipford in "The Independent Review," Winter 2004.

An interesting and succint analysis of complex issues

I had just returned from a trip to Russia when I came across this little book purporting to explain the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union. I've read other works on russian and Soviet history, but have never come across such a clear presentation of the issues to consider. Other reviewers have suggested that there's too much political bias in the account and that it's boring. I did not find this at all (especially the boring part), and I've always had a sympathy for the Left. Indeed, when I was in Russia and witnessed first hand the impressive and awe-inspiring achievements of Soviet and Czarist Russia (as well as some of the more horrific ones) I asked people to explain to me what caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, an idealist experiment that went wrong disappointing so many who hoped for a better system. You cannot help but ask these questions as you see the unbelievable luxury and wealth in Moscow and parts of St. Petersburg with the obvious poverty that co-exists with it. Yet, as the notes of the soviet anthem so poignantly reflect, The Soviet Union was supposed to herald a new era in human relations. Of course, reality has a way of breaking dreams and I believe that Stephen Kotkin has captured the illusion and its collapse, outlining the reasons and the effcts with unprecedented clarity. perhaps, more than this, Kotkin offers a model for analyzing the problems faced by all regimes as they attempt a reform from within and is a very effective text to understand politics in much of the developing world and I found personally usful in studying such regimes as Egypt under Sadat and Mubarak, Qadhafi's in Libya, or Asad of Syria. It's definitely a short book that travels very far.