Russia Against Japan, 1904-1905: A New Look at the Russo-Japanese War

by J. N. Westwood

Release Date: May, 1986

Edition: Hardcover

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The Russo-Japanese War; More than just a footnote

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 would hardly be more than a footnote in most history books were it not for the momentous events that occured after it. This conflict provided glimpses of the causes and carnage of both World Wars I and II. Westwood calls his book a "new look" so presumably there are new interpretations and conclusions for the reader to discover. By his own admission this is not the definitive book on the war nor is it meant to be "scholarly." Perhaps his most interesting idea is the mistake the Russians made by negotiating for peace to quickly. The war started because Russia's terriotorial gains in Manchuria threatened Japan. Like all of the great powers at the end of the 19th century Russia took whatever she could from the decrepid Chinese. After occupying Port Arthur, a natural naval base at the end of a pennisula in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese decided that such an occupation could lead to further gains in Korea. Korea was truly the "dagger aimed at the heart of Japan." When it became clear that the Russians were there to stay the war became inevitable. The Japanese leaders realized that they could not prevail in a long war against a major European power like Russia. Japan's navy, though modern and well-trained, was inferior to the Russians and her ships could not be replaced. While there were many land battles in the war the critical strategic objective for both sides was to control the Yellow Sea and the narrow strait between Japan and Korea. If the Russians could maintain a fleet in Port Arthur and Vladivostok they could prevent the landing or at least the resupply of Japan's army in Korea The war opened with surprise attack by the Japanese on the Russian ships in Port Arthur. Just as she was to do in World War II, Japan needed to strike quick and hard to avoid an unwinnable long war. The Russians were handicapped throughout the War by a lack of support at home and especially by poor admirals and generals. The most capable admiral was killed early in the war and his successors allowed the ships to rot in Port Arthur (after one half-hearted attempt to escape) where they were eventually sunk by Japanese land-based artillery. A relief squadron of brand new but untrained and uncoordinated battleships sailed from the Baltic to break the Japanese strangle-hold but the entire Russian fleet was destoyed in the incredibly decisive battle of Tushima. Peace negotiations began shortly thereafter. Westwood's conclusion that the Russians were in a better position after Tushima and the reverses that she suffered on land is hard to believe. The Russians had lost every single major land and naval battle of the war and there is no reason to believe that she would have prevailed in another. The Russian armies in Manchuria were driven back by the Japanese and could only be supplied over the Trans-Siberian Railway, a 50-day journey from Moscow. No Russian naval ship of any size was within 10,000 miles of the conflict after Tushima. Westwood's conclusion would be more believable if the Russians had shone more military prowess both on land and at sea. Certainly the Japanese were ready for hostilities to end for financial and man-power reasons but their strategic position was far superior to the Russians. Unlike the First World War, this was not a fight to the death. Westwood is correct though in saying that the Russian Baltic Fleet would have been better served if it had been held back as a "fleet in being" and not sacrificed. This lesson was not lost on the naval leaders of the Central Powers ten years later. The War exposed Russia to be an aging and incompetently-led empire. Shortly after the war there were strikes and mutinies and the Czar was forced to relinquish some power to the Duma. Russia's poor performance in the War greatly fueled the fire of developing Bolshevism. The Japanese became a quasi-great power after the war although recognition of this was slow in western political and military circles. Her victory over a major European country increased her appetitie for military aggresion and expansion which was tempered only by her lack of resources and a quickly diminishing dependence on western military technology. The strategic and tactical lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were put to test again by the Japanese in World War II.