Redefining Russian Society and Polity

by Mary Buckley

Release Date: October, 1993

Edition: Paperback

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Buckley's book illuminates the Gorbachev paradox.

Reviewed by Johanna Granville, Clemson University, Clemson, SC USA

On October 16, 1997 at a forum at Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University in Houston, Mikhail Gorbachev received the Enron Prize for Public Service. Former secretary of State James Baker credited Gorbachev for "setting the USSR on the irreversible path to freedom." Because of Gorbachev's "tremendous political courage," Baker claimed, millions of people enjoyed freer, more prosperous lives. But millions of Russians do not approve of what Gorbachev did, would deny him the Enron and Nobel Prizes, and mark him a villain because he caused the unravelling of the USSR and Warsaw Pact and because their lives are less prosperous in today's Russia. Mary Buckley's Redefining Russian Society and Polity helps the Western reader to understand the Gorbachev paradox by showing the Russian people's mixed reactions to glasnost. Her study is a key contribution to the growing body of literature about social changes in the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1992. She examines the manner in which Russian journalists, academics, and political actors approached social and political issues from the Gorbachev era to the chaotic post-Soviet period. Utilizing Russian newspapers, journals, radio and television programs, interviews, and other sources, Buckley persuasively argues that the images and ideas that blossomed during the Gorbachev years led to social and political visions that were incongruent with the prevailing system. These images eventually led to systemic disintegration. Buckley states, furthermore, that Soviet citizens initially welcomed the expanded coverage of material that had long been taboo, but as they suffered from the "failed economic reforms," they began to fear "deviance and social collapse." In other words, glasnost's candor about the various social "ills" (drug abuse, prostitution, AIDS epidemic, etc.), coupled with economic uncertainty, increased the citizens' fear about Russia's future. Later, in early 1991 and 1992 under Yeltsin's leadership, soaring inflation and unemployment rates caused panic over economic security and dread of imminent civil war or revolution. The Commonwealth of Independent States, Buckley further claims, has inherited the sociopolitical diversity and the deeply rooted problems so long buried by the communist regime. Her book employs a refreshing methodology. Rather than focusing exclusively on objective events, laws, parties, and movements, as do many, if not most, monographs on the former Soviet Union, Buckley also incorporates the "emotions, myths, analogies, and jokes" prevalent in the USSR from 1985 to 1991 to better grasp Russian social and political thought in the initial years of transition. Her book is enjoyable, in part because it is full of amusing jokes that capture the mood of the Russian people. Buckley helps the reader to understand the ironies of glasnost and perestroika. First, she reminds us that Gorbachev himself did not intend for his policies of glasnost and perestroika to go as far as they did. They were supposed to have limits; Soviet citizens were not to attack Lenin the founder or the socialist system itself. Gorbachev has become a hero in the West more or less by accident. Buckley points out that Gorbachev actually came to see glasnost as "disruptive" of perestroika. If one were to juxtapose his initial intentions for glasnost with their actual results, one might conclude that the policy ultimately failed. If the purpose of glasnost was to invigorate and improve the existing Soviet socialist system, then glasnost failed because it led to the utter collapse of that system. A second, related irony is that although Gorbachev initially intended to institute purely economic reforms, he realized that economic transformations required concurrent political reforms, hence glasnost. So he encouraged "openness" as a way to stimulate creative ideas and solutions "from below." He realized that granting more decision making power to local enterprise managers would decentralize political and economic decision making powers. In a command economy a Moscow planner cannot possibly make well-informed accurate decisions for local enterprises in the various oblasts and raions. However, without a willingness to change the essential hierarchical command structure, this partial "bottom-up" approach was doomed to fail. A third irony, in this writer's opinion, is that glasnost was the catalyst that led to the putsch attempt of August 1991 which triggered the collapse of the USSR. Public anxiety about increased crime and other social problems enabled communist hardliners to demand more law and order and less individual freedom. One can argue that people in an atmosphere of danger are generally willing to sacrifice personal freedom in return for more security. Gorbachev, as his popularity ratings fell in 1990-1991, moved just right of center and appointed conservative men--like prime minister Valentin Pavlov--who attempted to launch a coup in August 1991. In the wake of the coup, on August 23, Gorbachev declared his commitment to the socialist system. He had not intended for events to lead to the rejection of the Communist Party itself. A fourth irony is that Gorbachev failed to realize that in allowing more openness, he was giving Russian public opinion a role in policymaking. This can both help or hinder the leadership. As Buckley perceptively notes, glasnost can "be used to serve political ends and construct self-interested images" (as Gorbachev intended) "as well as impart unbiased information or provide more honest reporting." Gorbachev failed to anticipate the negative repercussions of glasnost. With the liberalization of Soviet society comes freedom to criticize even the Communist leadership itself. The end result was often exaggeration, which created undue alarm. What was especially needed in order for glasnost and perestroika to work was patience and an acceptance of disorder. As Stalin once said tritely, one cannot make an omelette without breaking a few eggs. The difference is that Stalin did not have to worry about a public outcry, and Gorbachev's policy of glasnost ensured that there would be an outcry. A fifth irony is that forces of separatism and irredentism came to overshadow glasnost. Glasnost enabled non-Russian nationalities to express themselves openly and to mobilize. As a result, center-republic relations deteriorated rapidly, especially after the August 1991 coup attempt, leading ultimately to the political collapse of the very state glasnost was intended to improve. Buckley raises a point often ignored by contemporary observers: that one must discriminate among the different phases of glasnost, and the different topics for subjects involved. "The way in which glasnost was applied was not smooth, unilinear, homogenous across topics, nor was glasnost without boundaries." She points out, for example, that, whereas in 1985, drugs, crime, prostitution, and suicide were generally not mentioned at all in the press, by 1987, these were common topics of news stories. The first phase of glasnost, then, from 1986-1987, involved the uncovering of these social problems. Some, such as child abuse and AIDS, were more controversial and sensitive than others, and thus disclosed later. Social problems were exposed first because they were still "safer" to reveal than issues of democratic reform, decentralization, ethnic/nationalist issues, and past military interventions. Topics that would lead directly to the unravelling of Gorbachev's authority and the authority of the Communist party as a whole were taboo. Articles about past Soviet military interventions in Eastern Europe, for example, specifically official Soviet apologies, did not appear in the papers until much later, toward the end of Gorbachev's incumbency. To some degree, one should not blame Gorbachev. Glasnost was a rational idea. New ideas needed to percolate up from the grassroots, to eliminate the stagnation of the Brezhnev era and energize the system by accelerating productivity. Glasnost simply did not fit the Russian polity. To understand in depth why glasnost and perestroika led to the collapse of the USSR, one must--as Buckley's book implies--understand Russian culture and history. Discussion of social problems during the Soviet period were still very controversial. According to the official ideology of the Soviet communist party, there were no social ills. People were portrayed as ecstatic to live in the Soviet Union and have the opportunity to participate in building socialism. Ordinary Soviet citizens who viewed the world through the prism of Soviet propaganda, were shocked to learn the true statistics about drug addiction, prostitution, and suicide in their country and suffered from lack of perspective. The crime rate, for example, might have increased in comparison to the earlier Soviet period, but in comparison to major U.S. cities, it was still low. However, the stark contrast between a dearth of inf